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Useful Review Marked by Conceptual
Vagueness
Ceci Verbaarschot , Radboud University
Pim Haselager, Radboud University
To this day, the experimental design of Libet and col-
leagues (1983) is commonly applied in neuroscience
research on intended action. Therefore, the review by Sai-
gle, Dubljevic, and Racine (2018) is most welcome as it pro-
vides a useful tool for checking the consistency across the
various results of these Libet-type studies. In addition, the
authors construct a taxonomy of Libet-type experiments
(see their Table 2 and Supplementary Tables 1 and 2),
which provides a useful overview of existing variations
within the Libet design. Moreover, their review highlights
the inconsistencies within and between publications: Often
only averages across participants are reported, no stan-
dard deviations are provided, or certain measurements are
recorded but not reported. These findings emphasize the
importance of concise research reports that allow valid
and complete comparisons between related studies.
The main goal of the authors is to reflect on what Libet-
type studies can tell us about the complex phenomenon of
free will. A review of the scale they deliver provides an
excellent opportunity to detect the core results that are
found consistently across studies and are in some way rel-
evant to our understanding of free will. However, in our
view, the authors failed to fully seize this opportunity.
First, they did not provide their definition of free will.
Without such a foundation, the discussion is marked by
conceptual vagueness. Second, the authors seem to take
for granted that Libet studies can tell us something about
the neuromechanism of free will. However, why such a
mechanism would exist and what it could look like remain
unspecified, which makes it harder to see exactly why and
in what way Libet-type studies are relevant to our under-
standing of free will.
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Most importantly, in our view, it is unfortunate that
the authors do not clearly specify what criteria a successful
replication of the original Libet-study should meet. They
seem to require an exact replication of brain signals in
terms of timing and location. However, if that is the case,
the comparison of all studies within their review seems a
bit off the mark. In their review, they include both electro-
encephalogram (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) studies. Reported timings and locations
between these studies are bound to differ because fMRI
studies have a much lower temporal resolution than EEG
studies. Therefore, the brain signals measured in fMRI
studies will be much earlier (relative to movement onset)
than those reported by EEG studies. Furthermore, the
authors seem to require exact replication of reported inten-
tion timings in order for a replication to be deemed suc-
cessful. However, fMRI studies allow for a temporal
resolution of 500 to 1000 msec for the intention reports,
whereas behavioral or EEG studies allow for one of about
20 msec. This means that the authors are effectively com-
paring apples to pears. If they really require an exact repli-
cation of brain signals and intention reports in terms of
timing and location, they should have only considered
those studies that use the exact same methods as Libet and
colleagues (i.e., the studies that compose Group 1).
Furthermore, we regret that the authors missed an
opportunity to include a concise review of the instructions
that are provided in Libet-style experiments. A difference
between instructions might explain a difference in the tim-
ing of intention reports. In contrast to what the authors
argue, the comparisons between different groups within a
single experiment (e.g., patient and control groups) might
be the strongest comparisons one could make. Within
these experiments participants received the exact same
instructions and performed the exact same task.
In general, the most important finding of the origi-
nal Libet study is considered to be that brain signals
arise before the intention reports. The reviewed studies
convincingly show that the readiness potential (RP) and
lateralized RP consistently occur prior to the reported
intention onsets. Therefore, contrary to the authors’
conclusion, they do replicate Libet’s main result. The
exact timing of brain signals and intention reports may
differ between studies, but their order does not: Brain
signals consistently precede intention reports (this is
very clear from their Figure 3). One could argue that
such replications, indicating the sequential occurrence
of brain activity followed by the awareness of an inten-
tion, can be considered inconsistent with a metaphysi-
cal definition of free will (i.e., a will that is
independent of the brain). However, in their discussion,
the authors suggest that Libet-type studies may not yet
be quite relevant for our understanding of free will. The
main reason for this is that Libet-type studies usually
investigate only simple finger flexions, which are not the
main example of a layperson’s definition of a voluntary
action. To be sure, we ourselves have been critical of
Libet-style experiments (Verbaarschot, Farquhar, and
Haselager 2015; Mecacci and Haselager 2015). But the
exact reasoning behind the authors’ statement remains
unclear. If we were to investigate complex actions in a
Libet-type setting and find the same result, that is, brain
signals that precede the conscious intention to act, would
this be relevant to our understanding of free will?
In summary, although the authors provide a useful
review of Libet-type studies, their discussion is marked
by conceptual vagueness. A clear definition of the con-
cept of free will and a specification of the criteria that a
successful replication should meet are missing. Without
these clarifications, the review lacks a sufficient founda-
tion for any conclusions to be drawn. &
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